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NOTES

THE ORIGINALIST'S DILEMMA: KATZ AND THE
NEW APPROACH TO THE STATE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY DEFENSE
Anthony J. Enright*
INTRODUCTION

Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution gives Congress the power "To establish ...

uniform Laws on the subject of

Bankruptcies throughout the United States."' In exercising this
power in the past thirty years, Congress has used language suggesting
limitations on the ability of states to raise sovereign immunity as a
defense to suits brought under federal bankruptcy laws.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19782 contained a provision indicating that states and the federal government were deemed to have
waived sovereign immunity with respect to certain bankruptcy proceedings. 3 "[N] otwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity,"
the Act declared states bound by certain court decisions. 4 In 1989, the
Supreme Court held that the language of the Act did not make sufficiently clear congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. 5 In response, Congress declared in 1994 that, in no uncertain
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2006; B.A., University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2003. My sincere gratitude goes to Professor Anthony
J. BelliaJr. for his invaluable guidance and insight. Thanks also to Professor Jennifer
Mason for helpful comments on drafts of this Note, research librarian Patti Ogden for
expert research assistance, and the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for their
thoughtful comments and hard work throughout the production process.
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.

2

Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.

3

Id. § 106 (repealed 1994).

4 Id.; see also Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 995 n.2 (2006).
5 Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96, 104 (1989). In 1992
the Court held that the Act did not waive the sovereign immunity of the United
States. United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 37 (1992).
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terms, state "sovereign immunity is abrogated" with respect to sections
of the Bankruptcy Code. 6
Less than two years later, the United States Supreme Court decided Seminole Tribe v. Florida,7 in which the Court held that notwithstanding its manifest intent to do so, Congress did not have the power
to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution.,
The 5-4 decision in Seminole Tribe called the constitutionality of
§ 106(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code into serious doubt.
Dissenting, Justice Stevens expressly noted that under the Court's
holding in Seminole Tribe, Congress's amendment to the Bankruptcy
Code to make clear its intention to abrogate sovereign immunity "was
for naught" because the Constitution denies Congress the power to do
9
so.
The majority of courts of appeals that wrestled with the question
agreed with Justice Stevens, who in Seminole Tribe saw "no reason to
distinguish among statutes enacted pursuant to the power granted to
Congress to regulate commerce ... [and] the power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy." 10 Six courts of appeals declared § 106(a) unconstitutional. 1 ' The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit was the exception-twice upholding § 106(a). The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue both times) 2 The first
13
time, in 2004, the Supreme Court declined to reach the issue.
6 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2000); see also Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 995 n.2; S. Elizabeth Gibson, CongressionalResponse to Hoffman and Nordic Village: Amended Section 106 and
Sovereign Immunity, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 312 (1995) (arguing that in passing the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Congress was directly responding to the Court's decisions in Hoffman and Nordic Village).

7

517 U.S. 44 (1996).

8 Id. at 47.
9 Id. at 90 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
10 Id. at 93-94 (citation omitted).
11 See Ga. Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. v. Crow (In re Crow), 394 F.3d 918, 922
(11th Cir. 2004); Nelson v. La Crosse County Dist. Attorney (In re Nelson), 301 F.3d
820, 832 (7th Cir. 2002); Mitchell v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Mitchell), 209 F.3d 1111,
1121 (9th Cir. 2000); Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown v. Pennsylvania (In re Sacred
Heart Hosp. of Norristown), 133 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 1998); Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths of Wash., D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1145-46 (4th Cir.
1997); Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. PNL Asset Mgmt. Co. (In re Estate of Fernandez),
123 F.3d 241, 243 (5th Cir.), amended by 130 F.3d 1138, 1139 (5th Cir. 1997).
12 Katz v. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. (In re Wallace's Bookstore, Inc.), 106 Fed. App'x.
341 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1727 (2005), and aff'd, 126 S. Ct. 990
(2006); Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. (In re Hood), 319 F.3d 755 (6th
Cir.), cert. granted, 539 U.S. 986 (2003), and aff'd on othergrounds, 541 U.S. 440 (2004).
13 Hood, 541 U.S. at 443.
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The second time, however, in 2006, in Central Virginia Community
College v. Katz, 14 the Court resolved the nearly thirty-year-old question-in some circumstances, states may not raise a defense of sovereign immunity from suits arising out of laws enacted pursuant to the
Bankruptcy Clause of Article I.
In a 5-4 opinion authored by Justice Stevens, the Court explained
that Congress, most litigants, and the federal courts had been asking
the wrong question. "The relevant question is not whether Congress
has 'abrogated' States' immunity," explained the Court. 15 "The question, rather, is whether Congress's determination that States should
be amenable to such proceedings is within the scope of its power to
enact 'Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies.'"1 6 The Court answered
this question in the affirmative: "Insofar as orders ancillary to the
bankruptcy courts' in remjurisdiction ... implicate States' sovereign
immunity from suit, the States agreed in the plan of the Convention
not to assert that immunity."' 1 7 Because the relevant "abrogation" occurred in the Constitution itself, the enactment of § 106(a) "was not
necessary to authorize the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction" over
claims against unconsenting states. 18
Katz is remarkable not merely for its outcome, but also because of
the different approaches reflected in the majority and dissenting
opinions. Although much of the Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence has been characterized by sharply divided, 5-4 opinions, all of
the Justices have recognized history as playing an important role in
determining what the law is today. 19 Katz goes a step further with respect to its use of history. Although it is also a 5-4 decision, the central
inquiry for both the majority and the dissent in Katz is an originalist
one: How was Congress's Article I bankruptcy power understood by
20
the Constitution's Framers?
14
15
16

126 S. Ct. 990.
Id. at 1005.
Id. (quoting U.S.

17

Id. at 1002.

18

Id. at 995.

19

See AnthonyJ. Bellia Jr., CongressionalPower and State CourtJurisdiction, 94 GEO.

CONST.

art. I, § 8, cl. 4).

L.J. 949, 952 & n.16 (2006).
20 See Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 996 ("The history of the Bankruptcy Clause, the reasons it
was inserted in the Constitution, and the legislation both proposed and enacted
under its auspices immediately following ratification of the Constitution demonstrate
that it was intended not just as a grant of legislative authority to Congress, but also to
authorize limited subordination of State sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy
area."); id. at 1006-07 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's conclusion "cannot bejustified by the text, structure or history of our Constitution," and that
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At the center of the Court's opinion is an important piece of historical evidence. Congress, just two years after the Eleventh Amendment was ratified, exercised its Article I bankruptcy power for the first
21
time, and passed a law that interfered with state sovereign immunity.
Under the Court's pre-Katz sovereign immunity jurisprudence and
the approach articulated by the dissenting Justices in Katz, this early
law would appear to be unconstitutional.
What divides the majority and the dissent is more than a difference of opinion over the proper inferences to draw from historical
evidence. In this Note I attempt to demonstrate that while the Katz
majority's originalism is more faithful to the original meaning of the
Bankruptcy Clause when the Clause is viewed in isolation, the dissent's
approach, consistent with the Court's pre-Katz jurisprudence, reflects
an effort to move closer to the original understanding of the Constitution as a whole. The incongruence between the historical understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause articulated by the majority and the
modern understanding articulated by the dissent reveals that the
Court's recent state sovereign immunity cases reflect a jurisprudential
shift occasioned by the Court's expansion of the congressional commerce power. To the extent that passage of the first Bankruptcy Act is
evidence of the Constitution's original meaning, it suggests that the
Court's recent approach to federalism is a modern surrogate for the
constitutional protection originally (but no longer) afforded by the
text of the Tenth Amendment coupled with the limited textual reach
of Article I.
The discussion proceeds in four parts. Part I describes Congress's
early use of the Article I bankruptcy power. It explains why the first
Bankruptcy Act would not have been considered a constitutionally
proper exercise of Congress's bankruptcy power under the Court's recent pre-Katz state sovereign immunity cases. The discussion in Part I
details why this is true even though the Katz majority is correct that
members of the Founding era probably believed the law was constitutionally sound.
Part II describes how the modern Supreme Court's expansive
Commerce Clause jurisprudence renders illusory the means by which
the text of the Constitution originally protected state autonomy. Part
III argues that the Court's contemporary sovereign immunity jurisprudence functions as a surrogate for the original constitutional means of
historical evidence reveals no "intention to abrogate State sovereign immunity
through the Bankruptcy Clause").
21 Id. at 1002 (majority opinion) (citing CHARLES WARREN, BANKRuPTcY IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY 10 (1935)).
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protecting federalism, and gives life to the original constitutional
command of state autonomy. Part IV describes the extent of the Katz
exception to the presumption that states enjoy sovereign immunity
not subject to congressional abrogation.
I.

CONGRESS'S EARLIEST USE OF ITS ARTICLE I BANuuPrrcv POWER
WOULD NOT 1HAVE COMPORTED WITH THE MODERN
SUPREME COURT'S PRE-KATZ SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY JURISPRUDENCE

The respondents in Katz had to overcome statements in recent
Supreme Court sovereign immunity cases that many believed had setfled the issue. 22 When the Court held in Seminole Tribe that Congress

did not have the constitutional power to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause of Article I, the
Court explained that " [t]he Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction. ' 23
The Court itself has read Seminole Tribe, the holding of which was

predicated on a recognition that states enjoyed sovereign immunity
absent congressional action, as making "clear that Congress may not
24
abrogate State sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers."
Because Congress's power "To establish... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States"2 5 is an Article I
power, it would seem that Congress could not use it to declare that
with respect to the United States Bankruptcy Code "sovereign immu26
nity is abrogated."
The Katz Court itself recognized that its holding reflected a

change in course from at least the language of its prior sovereign immunity cases. The Court expressly "acknowledge [d] that statements
22 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 11 (holding § 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
unconstitutional in light of recent Supreme Court cases).
23 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996).
24 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
636 (1999).
25 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
26 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2000). Several Justices had reached this issue in earlier,
nonmajority opinions and found § 106(a) to be invalid. See Tenn. Student Assistance
Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 456 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.)
("Congress lacks authority to abrogate State sovereign immunity under the Bankruptcy Clause."); Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96, 105 (1989)
(O'Connor,J., concurring) ("Congress may not abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity by enacting a statute under the Bankruptcy Clause .... ); id. at 105
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (finding that Congress had "no power to"
subject states to suit pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause).
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in both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Seminole Tribe, reflected an assumption that the holding in that case would apply to the
Bankruptcy Clause." 27 The Court concluded that this "assumption
was erroneous," and that it was not bound to follow the language of
Seminole Tribe because, as applied to the Bankruptcy Clause, it was
28
dicta.
If the Court followed the language of Seminole Tribe and its other
recent sovereign immunity cases, the Bankruptcy Clause, as an Article
I power, would afford Congress no power to subject states to private
suits without their consent. Under this approach, part of the Bankruptcy Act of 180029 would have been unconstitutional.

A.

The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 Provided for a Dischargefrom State
Debtors' Prison on a Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus

With respect to federalism questions, and particularly those concerning sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court has looked with a
keen eye to "early congressional practice, which provides 'contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the Constitution's meaning.' "30 In
Katz, this view brought into play Congress's first effort at a national
Bankruptcy Act.
In 1800 the Sixth Congress passed the first Federal Bankruptcy
31
Act.
The Act was largely a copy of the Bankruptcy Act then in place
in England, with one significant difference. 32 The American Act included a unique provision that authorized a discharge of a debtor,
imprisoned in state debtor's prison, on a federal writ of habeas
corpus. The law specifically provided:
That if any bankrupt, who shall have obtained his certificate, shall
be taken in execution or detained in prison, on account of any
debts owing before he became a bankrupt, by reason that judgment
was obtained before such certificate was allowed, it shall be lawful
for any of the judges of the court wherein judgment was so obtained, or for any court, judge, or justice, within the district in
which such bankrupt shall be detained, having powers to award or
27 Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 996 (2006) (citation omitted).
28 Id.
29 Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803).
30 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 743-44 (1999) (quoting Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997)).
31 Ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19. "This first Bankrupt Act of 1800 was by its terms limited to a
five years' operation, but it only lasted three years." CHARLES WARREN, BANKRuurcy IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 19 (1935). It was repealed in 1803. Id.
32 Randolph J. Haines, The Uniformity Power: Why Bankruptcy Is Different, 77 Am.
BANKRa. L.J. 129, 178 (2003).
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allow the writ of habeas corpus, on such bankrupt producing his
certificate so as aforesaid allowed, to order any sheriff or gaoler who
shall have such bankrupt in custody, to discharge such bankrupt
without fee or charge ....

33

By its terms, the provision authorized a federal court to issue an
order against a state official, in his official capacity, requiring the release of a state prisoner. A judicial action against a state official is
generally understood to be an action against the state itself, 34 and
under Seminole Tribe, Article I does not give Congress the power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity. 35 Under modern Supreme Court
jurisprudence, this provision would appear to be unconstitutional in
the absence of an exception to these general rules.
B.

Pre-Katz Sovereign Immunity JurisprudenceProvided No Exception to
the General ProhibitionAgainst CongressionalInterference with
State Sovereign Immunity that Would Authorize the
Bankruptcy Act of 1800

There are three potential exceptions to the Seminole Tribe principle that, if applicable, would authorize the habeas corpus provision of
the first Bankruptcy Act. The first exception applies where a suit involves a claim against a state official for prospective, injunctive relief
in order to stop an ongoing violation of the Constitution or federal
33 § 38, 2 Stat. at 32. This habeas corpus provision was the only one of its kind in
American law. Although the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82,
provided for a writ of habeas corpus that could operate to release federal prisoners, it
did not provide the same for state prisoners. See Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103,
105 (1845); ExparteBollman,8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 97-98 (1807). The first provision
granting a federal writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner "restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States" was
not passed until 1867. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385. Prior to
the Civil War the only other provisions permitting release from state prison on a federal writ applied to those imprisoned for acts committed on the authority of a foreign
power, or of the United States, respectively. SeeAct of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, § 1, 5
Stat. 539, 539 (permitting release from state prison on a federal writ for subjects of
foreign states imprisoned for acts "done or omitted under any alleged right, title,
authority, privilege, protection, or exemption, set up or claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction, of any foreign State or Sovereignty, the validity and effect
whereof depend upon the law of nations or under color thereof"); Act of Mar. 2,
1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 632, 634-35 (permitting release from state prison on a federal writ for those imprisoned for acts taken "in pursuance of a Law of the United
States").
34 Governor v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110, 123-24 (1828) (Marshall, C.J.).
35 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996); see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636 (1999) ("Congress
may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers .... ).
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law.3 6 Another potential exception involves the writ of habeas corpus.
This exception is predicated on the theory that the federal power to
issue writs of habeas corpus is not barred by the sovereign immunity of
states. In his Katz dissent, Justice Thomas relies on this theory to argue that the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 would not have offended the
Framers' view of sovereign immunity.3 7 A third potential exception
relies on the claim that "bankruptcy is different"; that is, the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I grants to Congress a power to invade state
sovereign immunity that other Article I clauses do not grant. 38 It is
this third exception that the majority recognizes in reaching its hold39
ing in Katz.
Each of these potential exceptions is addressed in turn. Because
each is either inapplicable or inconsistent with the Court's pre-Katz
jurisprudence, none of the three satisfactorily reconciles the first
Bankruptcy Act with the Court's modern approach toward questions
of state sovereign immunity.
1.

Ex Parte Young Provides No Exception that Would Authorize the
Bankruptcy Act of 1800 Because the Provision Does Not
Require Any Unlawful Conduct on the Part of the
State Official that Would Strip Him of His
Official Character

The habeas corpus provision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was
unique not only because of its applicability to state prisoners, 40 but
also because its application does not presuppose a violation of law on
the part of the state official against whom the federal courts were empowered to grant relief.
A claim against a state official in his official capacity or "by his
title" is generally understood as a claim against the state itself 4' and
thus implicates state sovereign immunity. As the Court explained in
36

See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73.

37 Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 1011 n.6 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("[H]abeas relief simply does not offend the Framers' view of state sovereign immunity.").
38 For a persuasive academic exposition of the bankruptcy exceptionalism argument, see Haines, supra note 32.
39 See Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 1004-05 ("States agreed in the plan of the Convention
not to assert any sovereign immunity defense they might have had in proceedings
brought pursuant to 'Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies'.... The scope of this
consent was limited .. .
40 See supra note 33.
41 Governor v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110, 123-24 (1828) (Marshall, C.J.).
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Seminole Tribe, a "narrow exception" exists to this rule. 42 The jurisdictional bar blocking suits against states and their officials is sometimes
lifted pursuant to the doctrine of Ex parte Young.43 Ex Parte Young is
credited with establishing what is commonly referred to as the "stripping doctrine"; the postulate that a state official is stripped of his official character when acting in violation of the Constitution or federal
law. Under such a circumstance the official's action
is simply an illegal act upon the part of a State official in attempting
by the use of the name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because unconstitutional .... The State has no
power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the su44
preme authority of the United States.
The Court's contemporary exposition of the "stripping doctrine"
allows federal courts to "lift" the sovereign immunity "bar" when (1)
the claim is "against a State official," (2) the claim "seeks only prospective injunctive relief," and (3) the relief is sought to "end a continuing
violation of federal law." 45 The habeas corpus provision of the first
Bankruptcy Act is consonant with the first two elements. The Act refers to the "sheriff or gaoler, '46 in whose custody the bankrupt resides,
by title, and can thus fairly be read to authorize an order against a
state official. 4 7 The only remedy that the provision authorizes is pro-

42 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996).
43 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73.
44 Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60.
45 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73 (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1986)).
The Court also recognizes that Congress may confine the action to a statutory remedial scheme, the existence of which precludes a federal court from permitting an
action against a state officer based on Exparte Young. Id. at 74. The remedial scheme
itself, however, cannot make lawful an otherwise impermissible invasion of state sovereign immunity, at least where passed pursuant to Congress's commerce powers. See
id. at 72.
46 Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 38, 2 Stat. 19, 32 (repealed 1803).
47 To the extent that the Act reaches local sheriffs or gaolers, in connection with
their enforcement of state bankruptcy law, they would probably be subject to the state
sovereign immunity defense to the same extent as state officials. Although local officials are not generally shielded from suits by state sovereign immunity, see Mt. Healthy
City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 572 (1977), the Court has held that
a state's sovereign immunity extends to local governments and their officials when
there is so much state involvement in the locality's actions that the relief effectively
runs against the state. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman 465 U.S. 89,
124 (1984). Furthermore, the Court has recognized county sheriffs as state officials
when sued in connection with duties that put them in the position of representing the
state. McMillan v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 793 (1997).
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spective injunctive relief, specifically, "discharge .. .without fee or
48
charge."

The provision ceases to be consistent with established sovereign
immunity jurisprudence with respect to the third element, the sine
qua non of the "narrow exception" 49 of Ex parte Young-unlawfulness
on the part of the state official.
Debtors discharged from debts pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act of
1800 were issued a certificate of discharge by a federal court. 50 If arrested for a discharged debt after receiving the certificate, the debtor
was afforded an appearance at which he could present his certificate. 51 The certificate would serve as prima facie evidence of the
debtor's discharge that required a verdict in his favor, unless the
plaintiff could prove that the certificate was defective because of fraud
52
or similar impropriety.
While a failure to recognize a valid discharge certificate could potentially result in confinement in violation of federal law, the Bankruptcy Act expressly recognized that some debtors would be lawfully
imprisoned under state authority for debts before they obtained a federal certificate. For such persons, the Act provided a different process-the habeas corpus discharge. By its terms, the habeas provision
extends to those "detained in prison, on account of any debts owing
before he became a bankrupt, by reason that judgment was obtained
before" the debtor obtained a certificate of discharge from the bank53
ruptcy commissioner.
The provision which made presentment of a valid certificate an
affirmative defense would preclude the state from rearresting and lawfully confining a discharged debtor. However, nothing in the first
Bankruptcy Act prohibited states from lawfully detaining debtors who
had not yet obtained a valid federal discharge. And nothing in the
Act rendered the confinement of such debtors who had subsequently
obtained certificates unlawful prior to the point of release on habeas
corpus. The habeas corpus release is not a remedy against states that
violate the Bankruptcy Act by holding discharged prisoners; 54 habeas
48
49
50

§ 36, 2 Stat. at 32.
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76.
§ 36, 2 Stat. at 31.

51

Id. § 34.

52 Id.
53 Id. § 38.
54 The statute expressly authorizes the judges of the court that ordered the
debtor's confinement to issue writs of habeas corpus. Id. This strongly suggests that
following the mechanism that the statute sets forth for discharge and release of prisoners constitutes conformity with, rather than derogation from, federal law.
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corpus is the sole mechanism that the Act provides for release of such
prisoners. The Act expressly contemplates that discharged debtors
55
will remain confined until released on writs of habeas corpus.
Because the provision expressly applies to those who were lawfully imprisoned by states before any federal proceedings began, and
because the Bankruptcy Act does not render such confinement unlawful, the provision does not involve the kind of illegality on the part of
the state official required for application of the Ex parte Young "strip56
ping doctrine."
2.

The Federal Power To Issue Writs of Habeas Corpus Carries
with It No Exception to State Sovereign Immunity that
Would Authorize the Bankruptcy Act of 1800.

A close parallel to the Ex parte Young exception in state sovereign
immunity jurisprudence is the well established power that federal
courts currently have to issue writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners
held "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States." 57 While habeas corpus does include an exception
to state sovereign immunity that permits federal courts to act on state
officials who confine prisoners unlawfully, the exception, like that of
Ex pante Young, does not extend to circumstances where the confinement is not alleged to be unlawful.
The Constitution provides that "The Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."58 Although the precise meaning of the Suspension Clause has been controversial 5 9 its
55 While the Bankruptcy Act probably did nothing to prohibit state law from ordering a debtor's release forthwith upon receipt of a federal certificate, it expressly endorses habeas corpus as the means by which imprisoned debtors would be heard and
released. Id. It would be an unreasonable stretch to read into the Act a requirement
that states do so, such that they act unlawfully when they fail to provide a different
means for administering the release of certified prisoners.
56 The Court in Katz finds that Ex parte Young does not provide an exception to
sovereign immunity that would have been understood by the Framers to have authorized the first Bankruptcy Act because "[t]he Ex pane Young doctrine was not finally
settled until over a century after the Framing and the enactment of the first bankruptcy statute." Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 1005 n.14 (2006). As
discussed, however, the first Bankruptcy Act would not be consistent with Ex parte
Young even today, as its habeas corpus discharge was not predicated upon unlawful
confinement.
57 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2000).
58 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
59 See WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 126

(1980).
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terms contemplate that the federal government would have some
role, or be subject to some limitations, with respect to habeas corpus
60
pursuant to what Hamilton called "the plan of the convention.
That role would be defined largely by Congress. As the Supreme
Court explained at an early date, "the power to award the writ by any
61
of the courts of the United States [ ] must be given by written law."
For much of our history, Congress largely refrained from giving
federal courts the power to issue writs of habeas corpus that could
effect a release of state prisoners. 6 2 Other than in the Bankruptcy Act
of 1800, Congress did so only twice prior to the Civil War, in limited
circumstances where the prisoner could claim a privilege under fed63
eral law or under the law of nations, respectively.
The form of federal-state 64 habeas corpus that is today most common originated with the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867,65 which empowered federal courts and judges to issue writs of habeas corpus "in all
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in viola'66
tion of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States."
The Act authorized federal courts and judges to issue orders effective
against "the person in whose custody the party is detained." 67 Because
the Act authorized federal judicial action against a state official that

60 THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 422 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey &
James McClellan eds., 2001).
61 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 94 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.).
62 Until the mid-nineteenth century, many courts and commentators recognized
the power of state courts to issue writs of habeas corpus to inquire into the legality of
federal imprisonment. See DUKER, supra note 59, at 149. The Supreme Court eventually held, however, that state courts are without authority to issue the writ to question
the custody of federal prisoners. See Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 409-10
(1871); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 514-16 (1858).
63 See Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, § 1, 5 Stat. 539, 539 (permitting release from
state prison on a federal writ for subjects of foreign states imprisoned for acts "done
or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption, set up or claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction, of any foreign
State or Sovereignty, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations
or under color thereof"); Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 632, 634 (permitting
release from state prison on a federal writ for those imprisoned for acts taken "in
pursuance of a Law of the United States").
64 By this, I mean a federal writ of habeas corpus that operates to release state
prisoners.
65 Ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
66 Id. § 1.
67 Id.
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would direct him to act in his official capacity, the Act appears on its
68
face to implicate state sovereign immunity.
Yet shortly after its enactment, the Supreme Court recognized
the validity of this provision in Ex parte Royall,69 and has upheld its
application many times since.70 The jurisdictional basis for federalstate habeas corpus remains virtually the same today as it was in
1867. 7 1 That state sovereign immunity poses no bar to the current
regime of federal-state habeas corpus is today taken for granted. The
relationship between the two doctrines has gone virtually unmentioned in recent years, even in leading works that focus on either or
72
both subjects.
While the constitutionality of the federal habeas corpus statue
may today be beyond question, the basis for distinguishing the current
federal-state habeas corpus regime from other forms of congressionally authorized suits against states is important in light of the limits
that the Constitution is understood to place on congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity. The constitutionality of modern federal-state habeas corpus, like the doctrine of Ex parte Young, depends
on an allegation of unlawfulness on the part of the state official. The
plaintiff seeking habeas relief must be "in custody in violation of the
73
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."
68 See Governor v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110, 123-24 (1828) (Marshall, C.J.)
(recognizing that a suit naming a state official "by title" is a suit against the state).
69 117 U.S. 241, 249 (1886) (Harlan,J.) ("[N]o doubt can exist as to the power of
Congress thus to enlarge the jurisdiction of the courts of the Union ....
That the
petitioner is held under the authority of a State cannot affect the question of the
power or jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to inquire into the cause of his commitment, and to discharge him if he be restrained of his liberty in violation of the
Constitution.").
70 See United States ex rel. Elliott v. Hendricks, 213 F.2d 922, 927-28 (3d Cir.
1954) (collecting Supreme Court cases in which federal-state habeas corpus was exercised "without the slightest suggestion that either it or the inferior federal courts were
acting beyond their constitutional power").
71 Congress has imposed some restrictions on the scope of inquiry in which
courts may engage when issuing the writ, see, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, but habeas corpus remains
available to those held "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).

72 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 3.3.3-3.3.5 (2d ed.
2002) [hereinafter CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw]; ERWAN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERALJURISDICTION (4th ed. 2003); DUKER, supra note 59; ERic M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS
Copus:
LIEBMAN,

RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY (2001); RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S.
FEDERAL I-LAEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2001); KATH-

LEEN M. SULLIVAN

73

&

GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (emphasis added).

(15th ed. 2004).
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It is the predicate unlawfulness that allowed the Supreme Court
to uphold the habeas corpus act in Royall. As Royalts author, Justice
Harlan, later explained in dissent in Ex parte Young, the only object of
a habeas corpus proceeding is "to inquire whether the applicant for
the writ is illegally restrained of his liberty. If he is, then the state
officer holding him in custody is a trespasser, and cannot defend the
''74
wrong or tort committed by him, by pleading his official character.
It is only because the state official is proceeding as a trespasser in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States that a habeas
corpus action "is not a suit against a State within the meaning of the
Eleventh Amendment, but a suit against the trespasser or wrongdoer. ''7 5 Justice Harlan believed that where the unlawfulness was lacking, a suit against a state official in his official capacity would violate
76
the sovereign immunity of states.

The majority in Ex parte Young did not disagree with Justice
Harlan on this basic principle. Rather, the majority offered it as foundation for the principle announced in Ex parte Young, that suits
against state officials in their official capacity taken in order to enjoin
an imminent violation of the United States Constitution are not suits
against states, because defendants in such circumstances are
"stripped" of their official character. 77 The majority and Justice
Harlan disagreed whether a state official lost the defense of sovereign
immunity when the plaintiff sought an injunction preventing a state
official from bringing an unconstitutional suit. The majority held that
he did, 78 while Justice Harlan argued that for an official to lose the
protection of sovereign immunity, he must actually be alleged to have
committed a trespass, and that "[t]he mere bringing of a suit on behalf of a State, by its Attorney General, cannot ...make that officer a
trespasser and individually liable to the party sued. ' 79
The entire Court in Young thus recognized that the reason that
federal-state habeas corpus did not implicate state sovereign immunity
was because it was predicated upon an allegation of official unlawfulness. If a unique exception to sovereign immunity had been recognized for habeas corpus actions generally, the "exceptional" habeas
corpus context would not have supported the majority's claim that
nonhabeas suits against state officials for prospective injunctive relief
are consistent with state sovereign immunity.
74
75
76
77
78
79

Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 198 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id.
See id.
See id. at 167-68 (majority opinion).
See id. at 168.
Id. 198-99 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
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If habeas corpus "exceptionalism" had formed the basis for the
constitutionality of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, Justice Harlan, the
author of the critical case on the subject, would probably have been
aware of it. Its absence from his dissent in Ex parte Young, which goes
to lengths to distinguish habeas corpus from the suit then before the
Court, suggests that Congress's Article I power was not understood to
have been augmented with respect to state sovereign immunity when
it affords the writ of habeas corpus as a means of bringing a suit.
To be sure, the constitutional text makes express mention of the
writ of habeas corpus, and does so outside of the context of Article I,
Section 8.80 The meaning of the Clause has been controversial, and
the Supreme Court has revealed a reluctance "to answer the difficult
question of what the Suspension Clause protects." 8' However, the
Court has held that "at the absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause
'
protects the writ 'as it existed in 1789.' 82
While habeas corpus may have originated in the fourteenth century as a device for compelling appearance before the English King's
instruments ofjudicial power,8 3 by 1789, "habeas corpus ad subjiciendum
was a prerogative process for securing the liberty of the subject by
affording an effective means of immediate release from unlawful or
8' 4
unjustifiable detention."
The United States inherited the writ of habeas corpus ad subficiendum from England. By the time of the Revolution, the writ was
firmly established as a device for securing release from confinement
only where that confinement was unlawful. The English Habeas
Corpus Act of 167985 directed that judicial actors in cases within the
purview of the Act "shall discharge the said Prisoner from his Imprisonment... unless it shall appeare... that the Party soe committed is
detained upon a legall Process Order or Warrant, out of some Court
that hath Jurisdiction of Criminall Matters or by some Warrant signed
and sealed [properly]."86 As Blackstone noted, the Act afforded a remedy from the orders of an "illegal court," under which the Court of
King's Bench or Common Pleas "shall determine if the cause of imprisonment were palpably illegal. '8 7 With its focus on unlawful con80
81

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.

83

INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 n.13 (2001).
Id. at 301 (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1996)).
DUKER, supra note 59, at 62.

84

Id. at 4 (second and third emphases added).

85

31 Car. 2, c. 2 (Eng.).

86
87

WILLIAM

82

Id. § 2.
BLACKSTONE,

3

COMMENTARIES

*131.
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finement, the Habeas Corpus Act was consonant with English
88
common law principles.
By 1776 some form of the writ, patterned on the English mainland model, was available in each of the British colonies that declared
independence.89 At the time of the Constitutional Convention in
1787, and through the Constitution's final ratification in 1789, each of
the United States secured the writ in its own right in a form comparable to that available in England. 90 When the conventions of the several states ratified the "Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus" 9 1 in
the Federal Constitution, they ratified a legal term of art with a long
and well-established pedigree. Because use of the writ as a liberty-securing device was, at the time of the Founding, only applied to persons unlawfully confined, it is unlikely that the Framers or their
contemporaries understood the form of habeas corpus enshrined in
the constitutional text to apply to prisoners whose confinement was
lawful, and not alleged to be otherwise.
To be sure, the definition of habeas corpus as used in the Constitution answers a question different from what powers, obligations, and
restrictions the Suspension Clause creates. Substantial disagreement
exists as to the answer to the latter question, 9 2 but resolution of the
88 See 9 WILIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 116-22 (3d ed. 1944).
89 DUKER, supra note 59, at 95-116.
90 Id. at 129.
91 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
92 See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337-38 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Suspension Clause guards against "temporarily but entirely eliminating the 'Privilege of the Writ' for a certain geographic area or areas, or for a certain
class or classes of individuals," without "guaranteeing any particular habeas right that
enjoys immunity from suspension"); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 406 (1963) (Brennan,
J.) (suggesting an argument that congressional refusal to permit the federal courts to
afford the writ might constitute an unconstitutional suspension of the privilege of the
writ); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., HOW HUMAN RIGHTS GOT INTO THE CONSTITUTION
51-74 (1952) (arguing that the Clause itself guarantees a federal writ of habeas
corpus not dependent upon congressional action); DUKER, supra note 59, at 155 (arguing that the Habeas Corpus Clause was originally understood to restrict Congress
from suspending state habeas for federal prisoners except in certain cases where essential for public safety); id. at 126 ("[I]t has generally been accepted that the intent
of the habeas clause was somehow to guarantee a federal writ of habeas corpus. Variations on this interpretation have suggested that the Clause itself guaranteed federal
habeas; that the Clause created a privilege; and that the Clause directed the judiciary
to make the writ routinely available."); FREEDMAN, supra note 72, at 19 (arguing that
the Framers understood the Habeas Clause to protect broadly against congressional
interference with the power that federal and state courts were assumed to possess to
order the release on habeas corpus of both federal and state prisoners); Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DuKE LJ. 605, 607 (arguing that the
Clause directs federal courts to make the writ routinely available).
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controversy would not greatly inform whether the Congress has a
habeas corpus power that is exceptional with respect to sovereign immunity. Whether the power to issue the writ must be granted by Congress, cannot be denied to states, inheres in the federal judicial power,
cannot be revoked once granted, cannot be temporarily suspended
with respect to certain classes, or all or none of the above, federal-state
habeas corpus and state sovereign immunity may harmoniously coexist in light of the stripping exception of Ex parte Young. Federal-state
habeas corpus does not implicate state sovereign immunity under Ex
parte Young to the extent that it applies to prisoners unlawfully confined. Because of this exception, state sovereign immunity simply
does not stand in the way of any recognized understanding of what
the Suspension Clause guarantees.
The term habeas corpus, as used in the Constitution, was recognized at the time of the Founding, and at the turn of the twentieth
century, and is recognized today as operating to release prisoners only
where they were unlawfully confined. If the Constitution augments
federal power with respect to writs of habeas corpus, it does not do so
in a way that allows Congress to interfere with state sovereign immunity in a way that it otherwise could not.
In his dissent in Katz, Justice Thomas explains that "habeas relief
simply does not offend the Framers' view of State sovereign immunity." 93 This is true with respect to habeas corpus actions predicated
upon an allegation of unlawful confinement because of the Ex pante
Young doctrine. The habeas corpus provision of the first Bankruptcy
Act, however, operated in the absence of unlawful confinement. This
suggests that the Act was understood to be consistent with sovereign
immunity not because it involved a writ of habeas corpus, but rather
because Congress was understood to have the power to authorize suits
against states pursuant to its bankruptcy power.
3.

The Bankruptcy Power of Article I Is Not Exceptional with
Respect to State Sovereign Immunity

The early Congress's passage of the habeas corpus provision of
the first Bankruptcy Act supports the Court's conclusion that
"[i]nsofar as orders ancillary to the bankruptcy courts' in remjurisdiction . . . implicate States' sovereign immunity from suit, the States

94
agreed in the plan of the Convention not to assert that immunity."
The first Bankruptcy Act, however, does not necessarily support the

93 Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 1011 n.6 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
94 Id. at 1002 (majority opinion).
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conclusion that the congressional bankruptcy power was understood
by the Framers as unique.
The Katz dissent's strongest critique of the majority is that
"[n]othing in the text, structure, or history of the Constitution indicates that the Bankruptcy Clause, in contrast to all of the other provisions
of Article I, manifests the States' consent to be sued by private parties." 95 While the majority may be correct that the Bankruptcy Clause
was originally understood to authorize congressional interference
with state sovereign immunity, Justice Thomas is also correct; nothing
about the "text, structure, or history of our Constitution" 9 6 indicates
that the Bankruptcy Clause was understood to give Congress more
power to interfere with state sovereign immunity than other Article I
powers.
The Court supports its conclusion that the Bankruptcy Clause was
understood to have itself abrogated a portion of state sovereign immunity with several pieces of historical evidence. The first is that in the
eighteenth century (as today) " [b] ankruptcyjurisdiction, at its core, is
in rem," and in rem jurisdiction "does not implicate States' sovereignty to nearly the same degree as other kinds ofjurisdiction. ''9 7 The
second is that one of the primary reasons for including the Bankruptcy Clause in the Constitution was to remedy "the intractable
problems, not to mention the injustice, created by one State's imprisoning of debtors who had been discharged (from prison and of their
debts) in and by another State." 98 The third piece of evidence is "the
legislation both proposed and enacted under its auspices immediately
following ratification of the Constitution"9 9-specifically the habeas
corpus provision of the first Bankruptcy Act.
None of these features of the Bankruptcy Power, however, set it
apart from the other clauses of Article I. Though in rem jurisdiction
may constitute a lesser affront to sovereignty than in personam jurisdiction, the Bankruptcy Clause is not limited to this less intrusive jurisdiction. Katz holds that the Bankruptcy Clause embraces both in rem
and in personam jurisdiction. 100 While the problems addressed by
the Bankruptcy Clause were unique to the subject of bankruptcies,
and the Framers' "primary goal was to prevent competing sovereigns'
95

Id. at 1014 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

96 Id. at 1006.
97

Id. at 995-96 (majority opinion) (emphasis omitted).

98 Id. at 996.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1000 (recognizing that congressional power over the "'subject of Bankruptcies"' is a "unitary concept rather than an amalgam of discrete segments" (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3)).
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interference with the debtor's discharge,"'' the historical evidence to
which the Court points does not suggest that these problems uniquely
10 2
required a surrender of sovereign immunity.
The best evidence pointing toward the uniqueness of the Bankruptcy Clause that the Katz Court considers is the habeas corpus provision of the first Bankruptcy Act. The Court notes that the "grant of
habeas power is remarkable not least because it would be another 67
years, after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, before the writ
would be made generally available to State prisoners."' 0 3
What distinguished the habeas provision of the Bankruptcy Act
from other habeas acts was not that it afforded a federal remedy for
state prisoners prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. As
the Katz Court recognized, 10 4 Congress passed two other habeas
corpus acts effectuating the release of state prisoners in 1842 and
1833, respectively.' 0 5 Moreover, contrary to the Court's timeline, the
1867 statute making the writ generally available to state prisoners was
0 6
passed before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.1
Id. at 1002.
102 See id. at 997-1001 (describing the difficulties Founding-era debtors faced
when discharged in one state and subsequently imprisoned in another).
103 Id. at 1003.
101

104

Id. at 1003 n.11.

105 See Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, § 1, 5 Stat. 539, 539 (permitting release from
state prison on a federal writ for subjects of foreign states imprisoned for acts "done
or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption, set up or claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction, of any foreign
State or Sovereignty, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations,
or under color thereof"); Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Star. 632, 634 (permitting
release from state prison on a federal writ for those imprisoned for acts taken "in
pursuance of a law of the United States").
106 The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, discussed by the Court, became law on February 5, 1867. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385; Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 374-75 (2000) (Stevens, J.) (noting that Congress enacted the statute empowering federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners held in
violation of the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States in 1867); Felker v.
Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1996) (recognizing that Congress expanded the writ of
habeas corpus available to state prisoners in 1867); DuKER, supra note 59, at 189. The
Fourteenth Amendment was not finally ratified until July of 1868. Proclamation No.
12, 15 Stat. 708 (1868); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 523 (1997) (describing
the history of the Fourteenth Amendment and explaining that it "was ratified in July,
1868"); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 434 n.12 (1994) (Stevens, J.)
("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868."); United States v. Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 676 (1898); Richard L. Aynes, On MisreadingJohn Bingham and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 97 (1993); Donald H. Zeigler, A Reassessment of
the Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative Histoly of Reconstruction, 1983 DUKE L.J.,
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Under the Court's recent sovereign immunity jurisprudence,
Congress would not have required the additional power conferred
upon it by the Fourteenth Amendment' 0 7 to pass the habeas corpus
provisions of 1833, 1842, and 1867. Under each of these acts, habeas
corpus was available only upon an allegation of unlawful confinement.
The orders that the acts permitted federal courts to issue against state
custodians, therefore, did not implicate the sovereign immunity of
states.'

08

The habeas corpus provision of the Bankruptcy Act was unique
because issuance of the writ pursuant to the Act did not require an
allegation of unlawful confinement. Congress has never passed a similar law using any of its other Article I powers. This, however, does not
necessarily indicate that the Framers believed that Congress could not
have done so. Congress does not always exercise all of its power.1 0 9
This is perhaps particularly true with respect to issues implicating
federalism. Many scholars have recognized that the political processes
established by the Constitution effectively discourage undue federal
encroachment upon the authority of states.' 10 In light of this, it is not
surprising that, throughout our history, Congress rarely subjected
states to suit against their will. That one of Congress's rare exercises
of Article I power in derogation of state sovereign immunity occurred
in the bankruptcy context does not suggest that the early Congress
viewed bankruptcy as exceptional."1 More likely, it was the invasion
107 The Court has recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment enlarged the
power of Congress and permits Congress to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity to
enforce the substantive provisions of the Amendment. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S.
509, 518 (2004).
108 See supra Part I.B.2.
109 That Congress did not necessarily use all of the power that it possessed is
demonstrated by the history of federal bankruptcy law itself. As the dissent pointed
out in Katz, for over a dozen years after the ratification of the Constitution, Congress
failed to adopt a single bankruptcy law. The first Bankruptcy Act was repealed in
1803, and for the next century, the congressional bankruptcy power went largely
unexercised. Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 1009 & n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
110 See, e.g.,
JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
175-84 (1980); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back in the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 278-87 (2000); Herbert Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 543-46 (1954).
111 This is particularly true given the fact that Congress's derogation from sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy context was itself extremely rare. See Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 n.16 (1996) ("Although the.., bankruptcy laws have
existed practically since our Nation's inception ... there is no established tradition in

the lower federal courts of allowing enforcement of those federal statutes against the
States."). The first Bankruptcy Act was in force for only three years. See supranote 31.
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of state sovereign immunity that was viewed as exceptional, regardless
of the source of Congress's authority.
Justice Thomas's critique of the majority opinion is particularly
fair because the majority says little to distinguish the Bankruptcy
Clause from other Article I powers. The Court makes a point of explaining that its "analysis does not rest on the peculiar text of the
Bankruptcy Clause as compared to other Clauses of Article l,"112 and
points out that "the Bankruptcy Clause, located as it is in Article I, is
'intimately connected' . . . with the Commerce Clause."' 13

Because, through the first Bankruptcy Act, the early Congress
used its Article I power to interfere with state sovereign immunity,
outside the scope of any recognized exception, the Court's pre-Katz
jurisprudence would have recognized the first Bankruptcy Act as a law
constitutionally improper for carrying out Congress's bankruptcy
power.1 1 4 By recognizing an exception to the Seminole Tribe doctrine
for orders ancillary to the bankruptcy courts' in rem jurisdiction, the
Katz Court embraces not merely a different interpretation of history,
but an approach toward state sovereign immunity that differs from the
approach of its prior holdings and of the dissent in Katz.
C.

The Sixth Congress Reasonably Understood the First Bankruptcy Act To
Represent a ConstitutionalExercise of Its Article I Power

Although even the early Congress could, and probably did, at
times, derogate from the Constitution as it was understood by the
Founding generation, the Supreme Court's recognition of early congressional practice as weighty and important evidence of the original
understanding of the Constitution1 15 is well placed. Because the first
Bankruptcy Act, though subject to significant controversy from its inception, was not denounced by its opponents as unconstitutional, and
because its passage consisted with the early Supreme Court's exposi112 Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 1004 n.13.
113 Id. at 1000 n.9 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 466 (1982)).
114 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 93-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In confronting
the question whether a federal grant of jurisdiction is within the scope of Article II1,
as limited by the Eleventh Amendment, I see no reason to distinguish among statutes
enacted pursuant to the power granted to Congress to regulate commerce among the
several States, and with the Indian tribes, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, the power to establish
uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 4 ... or indeed any other
provision of the Constitution.").
115 Both the majority and the dissent in Katz endorse looking at early congressional practice for "valuable insight into the Framers' understanding of the Constitution." Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 1009 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 1002 (majority opinion).
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tion of congressional power under Article I, the first Bankruptcy Act
was probably understood by its contemporaries to have been
constitutional.
1. Early Congressional Practice Is Valuable Evidence of Original
Meaning.
A particular act by an early Congress does not conclusively prove
the constitutionality of the act. Like the Supreme Court, 116 Congress
has the potential to make mistakes, and possesses some de facto (even
if illegitimate) power that would allow it to act beyond the scope of
what the Constitution permits. The First Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789,117 part of which was held unconstitutional in Marbury
v. Madison.118 Nine years later, the Fifth Congress passed the Alien
Acts, 119 together with the notorious Sedition Act, enacted July 14,
1798,120 which made it a crime to utter or publish "any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the
United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States,
with intent to defame . . .or to bring them .. . into contempt or
21

disrepute."1
The Alien and Sedition Acts proved immensely unpopular. The
legislatures of Kentucky and Virginia responded by passing resolutions denouncing the Acts as unconstitutional and asserting the right
of a state to refuse to comply with federal legislation that the state
considers unconstitutional. 122 The more offensive Sedition Act expired in 1801,123 its constitutionality not tested by the Supreme Court.

But the extent of the outcry and the identity of the authors of the
116

See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (recognizing that Bowers

v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), "was not correct when it was decided, and is not
correct today," and overruling the Court's prior holding). Lawrence and Bowers cannot both be correct.
117 Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
118 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
119 Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577; Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570;
Act ofJune 18, 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (repealed 1802); seeJEAN EDWARD SMITH,JOHN
MARSHALL 239 (1996).
120 Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
121 Id. § 2.
122 SMITH, supra note 119, at 246.
123 § 4, 1 Stat. at 597; SMITH, supra note 119, at 244. The Alien Act of June 25th
endured. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
209 (1998) (observing that because the Alien Act of 1798 is "[o]ften bracketed together with the Sedition Act passed at the same time, there is a tendency to think that
both were repealed as soon as Thomas Jefferson and his Jeffersonian Republicans

came to power in 1801. But while the Sedition Act expired under its own terms, the
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Kentucky and Virginia resolutions, Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison, respectively, 124 demonstrates that substantial doubt existed
as to the constitutionality of the Acts among important members of
the founding generation.
That Congress is capable of misinterpreting the Constitution,
however, does not prevent early congressional practice from serving as
valuable evidence of original meaning. The Constitution expressly
binds the members of Congress "to support this Constitution" by oath
or affirmation. 125 By confining the judicial power of the United States
to "Cases" and "Controversies," 126 the Constitution necessarily places
responsibility for its interpretation, where congressional power is concerned, in the hands of Congress itself in the first instance. The Constitution itself thus designates the Congress as a primary organ of
constitutional interpretation, and so Congress's authoritative promulgations deserve respect.
Early congressional acts possess two additional virtues as evidence
of original meaning. First, they were enacted from a vantage point
close to that of the Framers. Members of the early Congresses were in
a position to be familiar with the legal landscape under which the
Constitution was ratified-a legal landscape that is, in many respects,
very different from that of today. Second, the early Congresses included many of the Constitution's Framers-those who took an active
part in constructing and/or ratifying the Constitution. Early congressional practice holds substantial value as an indicator of the Constitution's original meaning.
2.

The First Bankruptcy Act, Though Controversial, Was Not
Denounced as Unconstitutional by Its Opponents

The Katz majority emphasizes the reliability of the early Congress's belief that its actions were constitutional. As the Court points
out, the first Bankruptcy Act was considered and debated during the
1790s,
during a period when State sovereign immunity could hardly have
been more prominent among the nation's concerns. Chisholm v.
Georgia, the case that had so "shock[ed]" the country in its lack of
regard for State sovereign immunity.. . was decided in 1793. The
Alien Act, with minor amendments, remained on the books at the time of World War
II').
124 SMITH, supra note 119, at 246-47.
125 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
126 Id. art. I1, § 2, cl. 1; see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803)
(holding that the words of Article III are words of limitation).
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ensuing five years that culminated in adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment were rife with discussion of States' sovereignty and
12 7
their amenability to suit.
Moreover, the Congress that passed the first Bankruptcy Act in128
cluded among its ranks many of the Framers of the Constitution.
Among them in the House of Representatives was John Marshall, who
had previously served as a member of the Virginia House of Delegates
that ratified the Constitution, 129 and who would go on to become
"The Great ChiefJustice." 130 Marshall had been appointed to the select committee designated to draft the United States' first Bankruptcy
Act, and was responsible for the inclusion of at least one provision in
the final bill.1 31 Marshall cast a decisive vote in favor of the Bankruptcy Act, the bill having passed by a vote of 4848, with the Speaker
132
of the House breaking the tie in favor of passage.
Although the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was exceptionally controversial, the response to it was very different than the response to the
Alien and Sedition Acts. While the Alien and Sedition Acts were attacked as having been unconstitutional,the leading opponents of the
Bankruptcy Act focused only on the Act's policy implications. As the
Court in Katz recognized,1 3 3 historians who have undertaken to survey
the arguments made against the first Bankruptcy Act have made no
mention of claims that the Act was constitutionally unsound.' 34 This
suggests strongly that the first Bankruptcy Act, though seen as imprudent by some, was largely understood to have comported with the
Constitution.

127
128
129
130

Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 1003 (2006) (citation omitted).
See Haines, supra note 32, at 186.
SMITH, supra note 119, at 112.
See CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE
RULE OF LAW (1996).
131 SMITH, supra note 119, at 258.
132 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 534 (1800).
133 Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 1003 (2006).
134

See BRUCE H.

MANN,

REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERI-

214-20 (2002); F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW
128-33 (1919); WARREN, supra note 31, 19-20; Noel and Warren each explain the
dissatisfaction with the law as having been based on three grounds: (1) the difficulty
of travel to the distant and unpopular federal courts; (2) the small dividends paid to
creditors; and (3) the comparative advantage the system gave to rich and fraudulent
debtors. See NOEL, supra, at 130-31; WARREN, supra note 31, 19-20.
CAN INDEPENDENCE
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Congress's First Exercise of the Congressional Bankruptcy
Power Comported with the Early Supreme Court's
Exposition of Congressional Power.

The habeas corpus provision in the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was
probably understood, at least by those who passed it, to have been an
exercise of Congress's authority "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution"' 13 5 the "Power ... To
establish... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout
36
the United States."'
Such an understanding would have been reasonable in light of
the early Supreme Court's explanation of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. Chief Justice John Marshall famously described what makes a
law "necessary and proper" in McCulloch v. Maryland 37: "Let the end
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional." 13 8 According to Marshall, the terms
of the Clause "purport to enlarge, not to diminish the powers vested
in the government."' 39
Marshall's explanation of "necessary and proper" does have limits. A means "necessary and proper" is a means "not prohibited" and
"consist[ent] with the letter and spirit" of the Constitution. 1 40 The
Chief Justice's discussion of another of Congress's enumerated powers, the Commerce Clause, 1 4 1 strongly suggests that an interference
with state sovereign immunity would not fall outside these limits. In
describing the commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden,1 4 2 Chief Justice
Marshall wrote for the Court that
[t] his power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may
be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations,
other than are prescribed in the constitution .... If, as has always
been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to
specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested
1 43
in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government.
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
Id. cl. 4.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Id. at 421.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 421.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Id. at 196-97 (emphasis added).
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If the Bankruptcy Clause, like the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, vests Congress with power as absolute as it
would be in a single government, limited to specified objects but plenary as to those objects, members of the early Congress could reasonably have believed themselves to possess the constitutional power to
enact the habeas corpus provision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1800.
The historical context in which the first Bankruptcy Act was
passed suggests that the Act's habeas corpus provision was "appropriate" and "plainly adapted" to the end of crafting a uniform bankruptcy law. 144 Discharging imprisoned debtors on a case-by-case basis
through writs of habeas corpus would be a sensible way for a "single
government" to administer a newly enacted bankruptcy law.
D. The Supreme Court's Modern FederalismJurisprudenceDraws a
Different Line Between Properand Improper than Did the Early
Supreme Court
The Marshall Court's line between "proper" and "improper" exercises of congressional power accords directly with the text of the
Constitution itself. Congress's power is expressly given in Article I,
Section 8. The specified objects of congressional power are numerous
and set out with particularity, suggesting that the words of Article I,
Section 8 are words of limitation. The Tenth Amendment confirms
this, by providing that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are re145
served to the States respectively, or to the people."'
In light of the phrasing of Article I, Section 8, the Tenth Amendment, and Chief Justice Marshall's language in McCulloch, a law would
not be "proper" if it is not addressed to "lay[ing] and collect[ing]
147
Taxes," 1 4 6 "borrow[ing] money on the credit of the United States,"
114
8
"regulat[ing] Commerce,"
establishing a uniform bankruptcy or
1 49
naturalization law,
etc.
This is itself perhaps an unremarkable proposition. Justice
O'Connor quoted Justice Story to explain that
144 See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 996-1000, 1002 (2006)
(describing state bankruptcy law in the early republic and recognizing that in enacting the first Bankruptcy Act "the Framers' primary goal was to prevent competing
sovereigns' interference with the debtors' discharge").
145 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
146 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
147 Id. cl.2.
148 Id. cl.3.
149 Id. cl.4.
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the Tenth Amendment "States but a truism that all is retained
which has not been surrendered." As Justice Story put it, "[t]his
amendment is a mere affirmation of what, upon any just reasoning,
is a necessary rule of interpreting the constitution. Being an instrument of limited and enumerated powers, it flows irresistibly, that
what is not conferred, is withheld, and belongs to the State
15 0

authorities."

If the Tenth Amendment and the powers enumerated in Article I
demarcate the line between laws that are "proper" and those that are
not, a law addressed to carrying out the regulation of "Commerce...
with the Indian Tribes," 1 5 1 would be proper even if it infringed the
sovereign immunity of the states. The Court itself has taken this view
in cases decided in the not-too-distant past. 152 When the Supreme
Court overruled these cases 153 and held that Congress may not subject
states to suit in a given area of law without their consent "[e]ven when
the Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over
[that] area,"' 15 4 the Court drew a different line between "proper" and
"improper" than that which the text itself draws in explicit terms.
The Supreme Court's modern jurisprudence thus gives somewhat
different content to the Necessary and Proper Clause than did the
Marshall Court by recognizing that some laws, even if "necessary" for
carrying out one of Congress's enumerated powers, are not
"proper"'15 5 if they are carried out as though the United States were a
150 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (citation omitted) (quoting 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 752
(1833)).
151 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
152 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("[I]t must be that, to the extent that the States gave Congress the authority to
regulate commerce, they also relinquished their immunity where Congress found it
necessary, in exercising this authority, to render them liable."); Parden v. Terminal
Ry. 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) ("By empowering Congress to regulate Commerce ...
the States necessarily surrendered any portion of their sovereignty that would stand in
the way of such regulation. Since imposition of the FELA right of action upon interstate railroads is within the congressional regulatory power, it must follow that application of the Act to such a railroad cannot be precluded by sovereign immunity."
(emphasis added)), overruled by Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 680 (1999).
153 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63-67, 72 (1996); see also Coll. Sav.
Bank 527 U.S. at 680 ("[W]hatever may remain of our decision in Parden is expressly
overruled.").
154

Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72.

155 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997) ("When a 'La[w] ...for
carrying into Execution' the Commerce Clause violates [certain principles of state
sovereignty] it is not a 'La[w] . . . proper for carrying into Execution' the Commerce
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single government. Under the modern pre-Katz approach, the habeas
corpus provision of the first Bankruptcy Act would not appear to be a
"proper" law, because it interferes with state sovereign immunity. 1 56
In articulating its modern "necessary but not proper" doctrine,
the Court in Printz v. United States15 7 cites an article by Gary Lawson
and Patricia B. Granger. t58 The article identifies substantial evidence
that "the word 'proper' was often used during the Founding era to
describe the powers of a governmental entity as peculiarly within the
province or jurisdiction of that entity."1

59

Lawson and Granger sug-

gest that even laws "within Congress's enumerated powers but that
significantly impair the autonomy of state governments can be 'improper' because such laws contravene constitutionally 'proper' principles of federalism," 160 though they admit that drawing the line
16
between "proper" and "improper" is not an easy task. '
The Marshall Court and the Court of today have both recognized
the constitutional necessity of distinguishing between a "proper" and
an "improper" exercise of congressional power, but they draw the line
between the two differently.
The modern Supreme Court has drawn the line between
"proper" and "improper" by looking at those attributes of statehood at
the time of the founding that were understood to be fundamental to
sovereignty. A law that interferes with certain of these attributes is
improper, regardless of how closely related the regulation is to a
162
power that the Constitution gives to Congress.
Clause." (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
18)). The Court has interpreted the Necessary and Proper Clause similarly in the
state sovereign immunity context. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732 (1999) ("Nor
can we conclude that the specific Article I powers delegated to Congress necessarily
include, by virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause or otherwise, the incidental
authority to subject the States to private suits as a means of achieving objectives otherwise within the scope of the enumerated powers.").
156 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 732.
157 521 U.S. 898.
158 Id. at 924
159 Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper"Scope of FederalPower:A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DuKE L.J. 267, 297 (1993).
160 Id. at 332.
161 Id.
162 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (holding that it is not "proper"
for Congress to use its Article I power to subject states to suit in their own courts);
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that Congress may not use
its Article I power to subject states to suit in federal court); Printz, 521 U.S. at 935
(holding that Congress may not use its Article I powers to "commandeer" state executive officials); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992) (holding that Congress may not use its Article I power to "commandeer" state legislatures).
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The Marshall Court drew the line based on the nexus between
the law and Congress's enumerated powers. If Congress's power is
plenary as to the objects specified in the Constitution and vested as
absolutely as it would be in a single government, the line between a
"proper" and "improper" bankruptcy law would seem to fall where
the
law ceases to be a uniform law on the subject of bankruptcies or a law
plainly adapted to creating one.
II.

THE MODERN SUPREME COURT'S EXPANsIVE COMMERCE CLAUSE

JURISPRUDENCE RENDERS ILLUSORY THE MEANS BY WHICH
THE TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION ORIGINALLY
PROTECTED STATE AUTONOMY

A.

The Modern Understandingof Congress's Commerce Power
Encompasses Virtually Everything

The shift in the Court's approach may be informed by the fact
that the Tenth Amendment, if applied literally today, would reserve
very little to the states. Because the text represents the "flipside" of
Article I, for any power to be "reserved to the States,"' 163 Article I, Section 8 must have meaningful limits. Under the Court's contemporary
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, however, it does not. The Court's
most recent case describing Congress's commerce power explained
that Congress may regulate any activity so long as there exists a rational basis for concluding that the activity, taken in the aggregate,
would substantially affect interstate commerce. 164 Congress may also
regulate activity that is purely local, so long as the activity is "part of an
economic 'class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce."1 65 The Supreme Court's modern jurisprudence recognizes the Article I commerce power as covering "virtually
66
everything."'
163
164

U.S.

CONST. amend. X.

Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2208 (2005). For a discussion of the impact
of Raich on modem Commerce Clause jurisprudence, see Tara M. Stuckey, Note,
JurisdictionalHooks in the Wake of Raich: On Properly InterpretingFederal Regulations of
Interstate Commerce, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. (forthcoming 2006).
165 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205.
166 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 170 (1985); see, e.g.,
Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S.
563, 576-78 (1977) (finding a sufficient nexus where the regulated firearm's only
asserted connection to commerce was having crossed state lines prior to the enactment of
the statute); Wickard v.Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) (upholding a federal law
regulating the growing of wheat for personal consumption). But see United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000) (holding that the commerce power does not
extend to providing a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated vio-
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Part of the explanation for this expansive understanding of the
Commerce Clause is the reality that "[t]he volume of interstate commerce [has] expanded considerably in the last 200 years." 167 Importantly, however, this does not provide the entire explanation. The
Court itself substantially changed the legal definition of the commerce power, particularly during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 168 Arguably, the Court could not have avoided this
course, having been coerced by President Roosevelt's "court packing"
scheme. 169 Whether this was the cause, the Court's current view of
what constitutes an exercise of Congress's "Power . . . To regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States, '170 is not merely an applica-

tion of the original meaning of the text to the commercial landscape
of today.
B.

The Original Understandingof Congress's Commerce Power Did Not
Encompass Virtually Everything

The definition of "commerce" that Chief Justice Marshall gave
when he described the power as having been "vested in Congress as
absolutely as it would be in a single government" 171 illustrates that the
modern Supreme Court gives the Commerce Clause a different meaning than did the Founding generation. As Chief Justice Marshall described it, "[c]ommerce

.

.

is intercourse.

It describes the

commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all
its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that
intercourse."'

172

lence); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (holding that the commerce
power does not extend to a prohibition against possession of firearms in school
zones). Morrison and Lopez do not render Professor Currie's conclusion unreasonable. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2195.
167 New York, 505 U.S. at 158.
168 See CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW supra note 72, at §§ 3.3.3-3.3.5 (discussing Supreme Court's significant changes in Commerce Clause jurisprudence
since the Founding).
169 In 1937 Roosevelt sought congressional legislation that would increase the size
of the Supreme Court by adding one justice for each currently serving who was over
the age of seventy. This would have allowed Roosevelt to appoint six newjustices-a
number sufficient to secure a majority on the Court that presumably would have upheld New Deal programs whatever their relationship to interstate commerce. Id.
§ 3.3.4, at 251; see also ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY,
187-96 (1941) (discussing the Roosevelt court packing endeavor).
170 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3.
171 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
172 Id. at 189-90.
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The view that Congress's Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 power extended only to prescribing rules for the carrying on of commercial
intercourse consists with an ample amount of historical evidence as to
the meaning that members of the founding generation ascribed to the
term "commerce." According to Professor Randy Barnett, who scrutinized the text of the Constitution, contemporary dictionaries, statements made at the Constitutional Convention, the Federalist Papers,
and statements made at the ratification conventions, an original understanding of "'[c] ommerce' means the trade or exchange of goods
(including the means of transporting them)."' 73 Justice Thomas, surveying historical evidence, has also found that "[a] t the time the original Constitution was ratified, 'commerce' consisted of selling, buying,
and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes." 1 7 4 According to justice Thomas, "[a]s one would expect, the term 'commerce'
was used in contradistinction to productive activities such as manufac75
turing and agriculture."'
Although scholars worthy of respect have contested this view of
the original meaning of "commerce,"'176 the text of the Constitution
itself confirms that whatever the original meaning of the power to regulate interstate commerce might be, it is not the power to regulate
"virtually everything." 7 7 If it were, the seventeen other Clauses of Ar78
ticle I would be superfluous, along with the Tenth Amendment.'

173 Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L.
REv. 101, 146 (2001).
174 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas,J., concurring) (citing SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 361 (London, W.
Strahan 4th ed. 1773)).
175 Id. at 586.
176 See, e.g., Grant S. Nelson & RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause:
Applying FirstPrinciples To Uphold FederalCommercial Regulations but Preserve State Control
over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. RE\. 1, 13-14 (1999) (arguing that the original meaning
of commerce encompassed any "gainful activity"); Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency,
Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L.
REv. 573, 595 & n.56 (2000) (characterizing Justice Thomas's concurrence in Lopez as
an example of "highly debatable historical excursus by originalist judges").
177 See Nelson & Pushaw, supranote 176, at 118-19 (recognizing that the authors'
interpretation of the commerce power is narrower than that of the Supreme Court).
178 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 588-89 (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing those matters expressly covered by Article 1, Section 8 that substantially affect commerce, and
characterizing them as surplusage under the Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence).
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This is not a construction that the words of the Constitution reasona-

bly permit.

179

C. While the Tenth Amendment's Text Itself May Once Have
Meaningfully Protected State Autonomy, It No Longer Does
Viewing the enumerated powers as having substantive limits,
Chief Justice Marshall left a substantial amount of power in state
hands when he declared the commerce power as "vested in Congress
as absolutely as it would be in a single government." 8 0 While Congress's power was plenary as to "prescribing rules for carrying on ...
intercourse,"' I8 1 and as to the other "specified objects"1 82 found in Article I, the substantial amount of law that could not be said to have
been addressed to these ends would not have been "proper for carrying into Execution"1 8 3 Congress's power.
With meaningful limitations on Congress's enumerated powers,
the Tenth Amendment performs real work, reserving to the states a
meaningful sphere of autonomy that can be legally asserted against
congressional infringement. The text of the Tenth Amendment coupled with the text of Article I constitutes an original, constitutional
command that the states retain a sphere of autonomy into which the
federal government does not have the power (as opposed to the wherewithal) to enter.
However, because Congress's commerce power has been judicially determined to extend to "virtually everything," a functional application of the Tenth Amendment's text protects the flipside"virtually nothing." An originalist may be disinclined to accept this as
the end of the inquiry. The Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence
may today allow "[lt] he Federal Government [to] undertake[ ] activities today that would have been unimaginable to the Framers," 8 4 but
this is largely the Court's doing. It is not the text of the Constitution
itself that has so empowered the federal government.1 8 5 That the federal government may undertake, in some manner, virtually any activity
that it has the wherewithal to do does not necessarily require a conclusion that the federal government may deny to states the attributes
179 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) ("It cannot be
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and,
therefore, such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.").
180 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
181 Id. at 190.
182 Id. at 197.
183 U.S. CONsT. art. I,§ 8, cl. 18.
184 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992).
185 See supra notes 168-79 and accompanying text.
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which make them states in a federal union, rather than mere federal
bureaucracies.
III.

THE SUPREME COURT'S CONTEMPORARY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
JURISPRUDENCE Is A SURROGATE FOR THE ORIGINAL

CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS OF PROTECTING
STATE AUTONOMY

A.

The Originalist'sDilemma: The Original Means of Protecting State
Autonomy No Longer Function To Achieve Their OriginalEnds

An expansive view of the subjects upon which Congress may legislate suggests a minimalist view of state power because the Framers
chose to protect state autonomy through enumeration and reservation. This creates an interpretive dilemma for the originalist' 86 who
sees the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence as fairly settled.
Such an originalist must confront the direct tension between the original constitutional command of federalism, and the original constitutional means of protecting federalism. Adherence to one original
constitutional command requires divergence from the other.
1.

Reversion to the Original Understanding of the Commerce
Clause Is an Impractical Solution to the Originalist's
Dilemma

One, perhaps obvious, solution to this dilemma is for the Court
to reconsider its Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Justice Thomas
has suggested this approach. 187 While this method would preserve
both the federalism that the Constitution commands, and the means
that the Constitution prescribes for protecting it, it would probably do
more harm than good. Our federal government is enormously large,
and it pervades the lives of individuals to a degree far greater than it
did when the Court regularly sought to enforce the constitutional limits on federal power.
Such a course would require dismantling much of Pennsylvania
Avenue. We have structured our government on an expansive understanding of federal power for more than half a century. Private individuals and state governments have diverted their energy and
resources to other efforts as the federal government has taken respon186 I use the term "originalist" to describe someone who seeks to determine the
meaning that a reasonable person would attach to the words employed in the Constitution-the instrument itself-at the time of the Founding.
187 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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sibility for more and more things, on the understanding that it had
the power to do so.
Whatever value there might have been in allowing our government to develop from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century without expansive federal power can probably not be recaptured by a
judicially compelled dismantling of the current federal government,
and the risks of such a course appear substantial. Although the relationship between the Constitution, stare decisis, and wrongly decided
cases is beyond the scope of this work, the Constitution probably does
not compel the Court to inflict severe pain on the people of the
United States in order to correct its own errors-at least in the absence of gross injustice.1 8 8
If the originalist accepts the continuing viability of an expansive
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, he or she is left with two options.
One is to retain the textual mechanism by which the Constitution protects federalism. Coupling the original meaning of the text of the
Tenth Amendment and the Necessary and Proper Clause with the
modern meaning of the Commerce Clause is not a difficult task.
However, the result is virtually no protection for federalism, and virtually no sphere of state autonomy into which Congress cannot intrude.18 9 The other option is the far more difficult task of using
nontextual mechanisms to protect the original constitutional command of federalism.
B.

The Court's Solution: The Original ConstitutionalCommand
of Federalism

In recent years, the Supreme Court has rejected the "easy" approach. Instead the Court gives life to the original, constitutional
command of federalism where an original reading of the Tenth
188 Cf Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling the "separate but
equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896)). Justice Thomas does
not suggest a complete abandonment of established Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring). However, even a jurisprudence that
simply treats "productive activities such as manufacturing and agriculture," id. at 586,
as being outside the scope of the federal commerce power would place in constitutional doubt a substantial portion of the federal government. This is not to say that
the Court should not continue to delineate the peripheral limits of the modern, expansive understanding of commerce. E.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
601-02 (2000) (holding that the commerce power does not extend to providing a
federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence); Lopez, 514 U.S. at
561 (majority opinion) (holding that the commerce power does not extend to a prohibition against possession of firearms in school zones). The Constitution does not
require that congressional commerce power extend beyond virtually everything.
189 See supra Part II.C.
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Amendment and the Necessary and Proper Clause coupled with a
modern reading of the Commerce Clause would not require it to.
In New York v. United States,190 Justice O'Connor, writing for the
Court, described a nontextual approach to the federalist command
that the Tenth Amendment embodies.
[U]nder the Commerce Clause Congress may regulate publishers
engaged in interstate commerce, but Congress is constrained in the
exercise of that power by the First Amendment. The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not
derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we
have discussed, is essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth
Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is
subject to limits that may, in a given instance reserve power to the
States. 19 '
The Tenth Amendment's text no longer does the work of reserving the state power that it claims to reserve. The Court has chosen to
give preference to the substance of the original constitutional command of federalism over the form, and treats the reserved power of
states as an affirmative limit on the congressional power conferred by
Article I. The Tenth Amendment clearly recognizes substantial power
as reserved to the states, and the Court has effectively said that it does
not view this power as having been expunged by the Court's expansive
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
By giving life to the constitutional command of federalism while
retaining an expansive congressional commerce power, the Court has
created a difficult challenge for itself. If enumeration and reservation
no longer distinguishes the "proper" from the "improper," what does?
1.

The Preemption Problem Renders Impossible an Approach to
Federalism That Corresponds to the Original
Understanding of Congress's Enumerated Powers

One apparent solution would be to treat the affirmative Commerce Clause power according to the Court's modern Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, while treating the Tenth Amendment as reserving those powers that the states would have been understood to have
retained under an originalist view of the Commerce Clause. The doctrine of preemption forecloses this approach.
"[U]nder the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption
doctrine is derived, 'any state law, however clearly within a State's acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law,
190

505 U.S. 144 (1992).

191

Id. at 156-57.
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must yield.' "192 The exercise of power by the federal government will
necessarily restrict the ability of states to act in that same field. If both
Congress and
a state sought to legislate in incompatible ways in the
"periphery"' 93 of the Commerce Clause, one sovereign's act would
have to trump the other. Either Congress would lose its expansive
Commerce Clause power, or the states would be in a position no different than if the Court recognized no judicially enforceable sphere
of state autonomy. It would be impossible to allow Congress to legislate "virtually anything" under the Commerce Clause, while reserving
to states all power in respect to matters beyond "prescribing rules for
carrying on . . .intercourse.

'

94

Because of the preemption problem, an expansive view of the
commerce power makes impossible a federalism jurisprudence that
perfectly corresponds to the allocation of power set forth by the constitutional text. Either congressional power will extend into areas of
state sovereignty that the text, as originally understood, left with the
states, or Congress will be denied some power that it would have had
under the Constitution as originally understood.
2.

First Attempt: Traditional State Functions

Because of the preemption problem, over or under inclusiveness
will necessarily be a feature of any approach toward reconciling the
constitutional command of federalism with an expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause. Recognizing this, one option is to give
life to the original constitutional command of federalism by recognizing a sphere of inviolate state autonomy where states act "in their capacities as sovereign governments."1' 9 5 The Court followed this
approach in National League of Cities v. Usery, 19 6 in which it held that
laws which "operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress by [the
Commerce Clause]. '' 197 In so holding, the Court recognized a limit

on the substantive ends at which Congress could aim using its Article I
192 Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (quoting Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988)).
193 I use the term "periphery" to refer to the sphere of authority that the Court
currently recognizes Congress to have, but that extends beyond prescribing rules for
carrying on commercial intercourse.
194 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824).
195 Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
196 426 U.S. 833.
197 Id. at 852
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power, and struck down portions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
which required the payment of the minimum wage to state and local
employees. a98

The difficulty of an approach that aims at the substance of the
regulation-that is, the object, as opposed to the means by which the
object is achieved-is that an expansive reading of the Commerce
Clause removes the constitutional standards for determining the
proper objects of congressional regulation. Because the commerce
power reaches virtually every object, an effort to limit the permissible
objects of congressional regulation is really an effort to limit what substantively constitutes a regulation of interstate commerce. Because
the "traditional governmental functions" approach does not purport
to turn on the relationship that the object of regulation has to interstate commerce, it is open to the charge that it "invites an unelected
federal judiciary to make decisions about which State policies it favors
and which ones it dislikes." 199
3.

Second Attempt: The Political Safeguards of Federalism

The Court lobbed this charge against itself in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority20 0 and expressly overruled
Usery.20 1 In its place, to secure the constitutional command of federalism the Court relied on the political processes set forth in the Constitution. As Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court:
Of course, we continue to recognize that the States occupy a special
and specific position in our constitutional system and that the scope
of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause must reflect
that position. But the principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action-the builtin restraints that our system provides through State participation in
federal governmental action. The political process ensures that laws
20 2
that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated.
According to Garcia, "State sovereign interests, then, are more
properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure
of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal
power."203
198

Id. at 851-52

199

Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.

200
201
202
203

469 U.S. 528.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 552.
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Whether the so-called "political safeguards of federalism" effectively provide protection for state autonomy is a highly debatable proposition. 20 4 Whatever protection they do afford, however, the text of
the Constitution specifically provides in addition to the constraints imposed by Article I, Section 8 and the Tenth Amendment. As something that the text of the Constitution independently requires, the socalled political safeguards of federalism cannot be a meaningful surrogate for what the text of the Constitution originally guaranteed
through enumeration and reservation.
4.

The Court's Modern Approach Before Katz: Transsubstantive,
Affirmative Limitations on the Means of Congressional
Regulation

The Court in recent years has taken an approach that gives life to
the original constitutional command of federalism independent of
the political safeguards enshrined in the text. In several contexts in
recent years, the Court has employed a framework that applies principles of state autonomy as judicially enforceable affirmative limits on
congressional power. In New York v. United States,20 5 the Court held
that Congress may not "commandeer" state legislatures by requiring
them to legislate in furtherance of a federal program. 20 6 In Printz v.
United States,2 0 7 the Court held that Congress may not "commandeer"
state executive officials by requiring them to execute a federal
208
program.
Prior to Katz, 20

9

the Court had taken a very similar approach in

the state sovereign immunity context, holding that Congress may not
204

Compare CHOPER, supra note 110, at 175-84 (arguing that federal courts should

regard constitutional federalism questions as non-justiciable and leave their final resolution to the political process), Kramer, supra note 110, at 293 ("There are 'political
safeguards' of federalism, safeguards that have a longer pedigree and a stronger claim
to constitutional legitimacy than the current Supreme Court's clumsy bid to impose
its will on Congress."), and Wechsler, supra note 110, at 559 (arguing that political
safeguards do effectively protect federalism), with Bellia, supra note 19, at 1012
("[W]hen, by operation of the political safeguards of federalism, Congress directly
divests state institutions of power, it may leave behind political safeguards of federalism that, as a functional matter, are something less than they were before Congress
acted.").
205 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
206 Id. at 175.
207 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
208 Id. at 933.
209 Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990 (2006).

2oo6]

THE ORIGINALIST'S

DILEMMA

1591

use any of its Article I powers to subject states to suit without their
2 10
consent.
The Court's modern approach differs from the "traditional governmental functions" approach of Userf'I in that it focuses not on the
ultimate object of regulation, but rather the means by which the object is regulated. Congress thus retains its power to regulate "virtually
anything" pursuant to the Commerce Clause, but the means that it
uses for doing so must be "necessary and proper." When a means
employed by Congress intrudes on certain fundamental principles of
state sovereignty, it is not a means proper for regulating the objects of
2 12
congressional power.
This approach differs from the Usery approach and the approach
the Tenth Amendment contemplates in that it is transsubstantive.
Certain means are off limits for Congress, regardless of the end that
Congress seeks to achieve. Even if the object of a law were clearly
within the scope of Congress's Article I power as that power was originally understood, and even if the means Congress used were plainly
adapted to achieving that object, the law would be unconstitutional if
it violated certain principles of state sovereignty such as state sovereign immunity.2 1 3 Under this approach the first Bankruptcy Act's interference with state sovereign immunity does not compel a
conclusion that Congress may today interfere with state sovereign immunity when exercising its bankruptcy power. The founding generation understood the Constitution to protect federalism by limiting the
210 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (holding that Congress may not use
its Article I power to subject states to suit in state courts); Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that Congress may not use its Article I power to
subject states to suit in federal courts).
211 Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
212 See cases cited supra note 162.
213 The Court appears to take a transsubstantive approach in much of its federalismjurisprudence. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 754 ("In light of history, practice, precedent,
and the structure of the Constitution, we hold that the States retain immunity from
private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the congressionalpower to abrogate
by Article I legislation." (emphasis added)); Printz, 521 U.S. at 924 (" [E]ven where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting
certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the states to require or prohibit
those acts." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992))); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72 ("Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties
against unconsenting States."); New York, 505 U.S. at 178 ("No matter how powerful the
federal interest involved, the Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority to
require the States to regulate." (emphasis added)).
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objects that Congress could regulate; as a surrogate for those substantive limits, the Court in its pre-Katz jurisprudence interpreted the
Constitution to protect federalism by limiting the means that Congress may use to regulate.
IV.

KATZ:

A NARROW

EXCEPTION OR NEW PARADIGM?

Katz squarely presented the Supreme Court with the originalist's
dilemma. Historical evidence strongly suggests that the Constitution,
as it was originally understood, would have permitted the action in
Katz against the petitioners, notwithstanding their assertion of sovereign immunity. But the Constitution as it was originally understood
also placed significant, judicially enforceable limits on the power of
Congress to interfere with state sovereign immunity-through limitations on the scope of the commerce power.
Four members of the Katz Court resolve the dilemma in favor of
protecting the original constitutional command of federalism by voting to uphold the sovereign immunity of the petitioners notwithstanding the historical evidence. 2 14 The majority, by contrast, resolves the
dilemma by viewing the Bankruptcy Clause in isolation. 2 15 Because it
was originally understood to permit Congress to subject states to private suits without their consent, it permits Congress to do so todayeven though the Constitution as it was originally understood denied
to Congress many of the other powers that it currently enjoys.
Although the Katz majority and dissent reflect different approaches to state sovereign immunity, the holding of Katz itself does
not represent a new paradigm for future sovereign immunity cases so
much as an application of the framework that the Court articulated in
2 17
Seminole Tribe21 6 and Alden v. Maine.
Seminole Tribe reaffirmed the longstanding principle that states
were, at the time of the Founding, and are today, immune from private suits in federal courts. 21 8 Alden recognized that at the time of the
Founding states possessed a well established right of a sovereign to
2 19
assert immunity from suit in the sovereign's own courts.
In Alden the Court made clear that the right of a state to assert
sovereign immunity is the rule, and congressional power to subject
states to suit without their consent is the exception. According to Al214

Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 1014 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1004 (majority opinion).

215
216

517 U.S. 44.

217
218
219

527 U.S. 706.
517 U.S. at 47.
527 U.S. at 741.
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den, the burden is on Congress, who "may subject the States to private
suits . . . only if there is 'compelling evidence' that the States were

required to surrender the power to Congress pursuant to the constitu' 20
tional design."
The Alden Court found no compelling evidence that the states
were required to surrender their power to assert sovereign immunity
with respect to private suits in their own courts. 22' In contrast, "compelling evidence" exists that the states were required, as part of the
constitutional design, to surrender the power to assert a sovereign immunity defense with respect to orders ancillary to in rem proceedings
that Congress authorized pursuant to its Article I bankruptcy power.
The rhetoric that Katz rejected as reflecting an "erroneous" assumption was that which presumed that meeting this standard was a
wholly insurmountable hurdle. 222 At most, the holding of Katz transforms what was an absolute rule into a very strong presumption. This
presumption should continue to be effective to give life to the original, constitutional command of federalism by restraining Congress's
power to subject states to private suit in all cases where the original
understanding of the Constitution is not unmistakably clear.
In Alden the Court examined a significant amount of evidence
suggesting that states did surrender a portion of their sovereign immunity. Among other evidence, the Court examined the ratification
debates, which reveal that many of the Framers believed that a surrender had occurred. 2 23 The Court also noted that in 1793 it had held in
Chisholm that states could not assert sovereign immunity from suit,
and that the Eleventh Amendment did not, by its terms at least, re224
solve whether states retained sovereign immunity in state courts.
The Alden Court did not regard this as even "persuasive evidence that
the founding generation regarded the States' sovereign immunity as
defeasible by federal statute," 225 much less compelling evidence.
Like Katz, Alden also evaluated early congressional practice. Unlike in Katz, the Alden Court found no evidence of early statutes subjecting states to suit in their own courts. Alden understood the
Founders' silence to indicate that the Founders did not understand
the Constitution to alter the right of states to assert sovereign
immunity.
220
221
222
223
224
225
226

226

Id. at 731.
See id. at 754.
Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct 990, 996 (2006).
527 U.S. at 733-34.
Id. at 734 (citing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 449 (1793)).
Id. at 733.
Id. at 741.
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Alden and Katz are instructive as to what quantum of evidence is
sufficiently "compelling" to overcome the strong presumption that
states may assert sovereign immunity notwithstanding congressional
action. The substantial amount of evidence examined in Alden suggests that for evidence to be "compelling" it must approach the
equivalent of at least one act passed by an early Congress that directly
interfered with state sovereign immunity, and that raised no constitutional doubt.
CONCLUSION

The habeas corpus provision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 suggests that state sovereign immunity was an attribute of sovereignty that
was originally protected by the text of the Constitution-through enumeration and reservation. Because of the Court's expansion of the
federal commerce power, enumeration and reservation today protects
virtually nothing. The Court's recent jurisprudence recognizing that
an otherwise valid exercise of Article I power is constitutionally improper because it interferes with state sovereign immunity employs a
nontextual limitation on congressional means as a surrogate for the
original textual mechanism for protecting federalism. Through this
limitation the Court breathes life into the original constitutional command that states in our republic remain autonomous, sovereign entities, rather than subordinate components of the federal government.
Katz reveals a limit on this nontextual mechanism, requiring it to
yield where historical practice makes Congress's power to subject unconsenting states to private suits unmistakably clear. The Court's approach perfectly preserves neither the original understanding of state
sovereignty nor congressional power, but a perfect reconciliation of
the two is impossible in light of Congress's judicially expanded commerce power. Because the Court's modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence eviscerates the constitutional mechanism for striking the
balance between congressional power and state autonomy, the Court
is correct to endeavor to give meaning to the original constitutional
command of federalism through other mechanisms, even if they are
imperfect.

